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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Ian Dixon (“Dixon”) appeals a sentence imposed on him following his 
guilty plea to illegal re-entry into the United States without authorization after having 
been deported subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).  Dixon claims that the District Court erred in rejecting his 
argument that several factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) compelled a reduction in his 
sentence below the advisory guidelines range, and erred when it placed excessive weight 
on his criminal history in deciding to impose a within-guidelines range prison term.  
Because we find that the District Court did not err, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Ian Dixon, a native of Jamaica, moved to Orange, New Jersey, with his mother 
and siblings in the mid-1980s.  He remains a citizen of Jamaica.   
On September 3, 1989, at the age of 17, Dixon pleaded guilty to criminal 
possession of stolen property (a stolen vehicle).  On July 15, 1990, he was charged with 
aggravated assault on a police officer, damage to property, and possession of a weapon.  
Following conviction for these charges, he served 180 days in county jail.  He was next 
arrested for three drug distribution offenses in Essex County, New Jersey.  A few months 
later, he was arrested for a drug offense in Maryland.  On February 15, 1992, he was 
arrested and charged with second degree murder, unlawful possession of a handgun, and 
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.  He was ultimately convicted in New 
Jersey, on September 2, 1992, of aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, 
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and distribution of  cocaine within 1,000 
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feet of a school zone.  He was sentenced on December 22, 1992, to five years for the drug 
offense and ten years for assault.  Dixon was paroled by New Jersey on May 17, 1996.   
Dixon was next arrested on March 22, 1997, and pleaded guilty to refusing to obey 
an official request.  He was again arrested on June 25, 1997, for drug distribution 
offenses, and pleaded guilty to reduced charges, receiving a 180-day suspended sentence 
and a fine.   His parole was revoked on February 6, 1998, and he was recommitted to 
state custody.  Dixon was deported from the United States on or about December 7, 1998. 
 Dixon re-entered the United States illegally, and on September 4, 2004, was 
arrested in Maryland and charged with a drug offense, possession of fraudulent personal 
identification to avoid prosecution, and making false statements to a police officer.  He 
was convicted of possession of marijuana, and, after an appeal which reduced his original 
sentence, was resentenced to a 60-day term of imprisonment.   
 On August 20, 2005, Dixon was again found in possession of marijuana, a 
throwing knife, and a false driver‟s license.  He pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana 
and was sentenced to one year of probation. 
 On October 28, 2008, an automobile driven by one Duwan Elliott was stopped by 
police.  Elliott fled from the car and ran into a house occupied by Dixon.  When 
apprehended,  Elliott and Dixon were found to be in possession of a .357 magnum 
revolver and a bulletproof vest.  Dixon was charged with unlawful possession of a 
handgun and served 86 days in Essex County Jail.  At the time of his arrest, Dixon gave 
his name as Daniel Tibor, and stated that he was from Haiti.  A fingerprint analysis, 
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however, confirmed his identity as Ian Dixon and his prior deportation.  On January 22, 
2009, Dixon pleaded guilty to state charges of unlawful possession of a handgun. 
 On March 20, 2009, Dixon was charged by complaint in the District of New 
Jersey with illegal reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 
(b)(2).  Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty on September 17, 2009, to a one-
count information containing the same charges.  
 The District Court held a sentencing hearing on February 18, 2010.  After finding 
a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of V, the Court determined that 
Dixon faced an advisory guidelines range of 70-87 months of imprisonment.  Dixon 
requested a variance from the guidelines range, but the Court sentenced him to a 70-
month term of imprisonment.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court must 
pursue a three-step sequential process: first, determine a defendant‟s advisory sentencing 
guidelines range; second, formally rule on departure motions from both parties and state 
on the record whether a departure is being granted and how that affects the advisory 
guidelines range; and third, exercise discretion by considering the relevant section 
3553(a) factors in imposing the sentence.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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 “Our appellate review proceeds in two stages.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  First, we 
ensure “„that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing 
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence--including an 
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.‟”  Id.  (quoting Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  If the district court‟s procedure is satisfactory, we move 
to stage two, considering the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  Id. (citing 
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)).  The substantive review 
mandates that we consider the totality of the circumstances, rather than one or two 
factors.  Id.  “We afford deference to the District Court because it is in the best position to 
determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.”  
United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation and citation 
omitted).  
 Dixon‟s appeal concerns only the third step in the sentencing process.  He argues 
that his sentence was procedurally flawed because the District Court failed to give 
meaningful consideration to pertinent non-guidelines factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
Specifically, Dixon contends that the District Court failed to give appropriate 
consideration to the following factors:  (1) his crime was non-violent;  (2) he returned 
illegally to the United States for the sole purpose of supporting and spending time with 
his family;  (3) the majority of his crimes were committed as a young adult and are not 
reflective of the man he is today;  and (4) his sentence would be considerably harsher 
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than that of other defendants within the same total offense level and criminal history 
category because of his status as a deportable alien.  As to this last contention, Dixon 
argues that he had already been in custody for 16 months at the time of his sentencing, 
and five of those months would not be counted toward his federal sentence because he 
was then in state custody.  As a deportable alien, he argues that his sentence was already 
harsher than other offenders of the same total offense level and criminal history category 
because he is not eligible to be released to a halfway house and he will spend additional 
time in immigration custody upon release from prison.   
 Our review of the record reveals no failing on the part of the District Court to 
accord “meaningful consideration” to the section 3553(a) factors.  See United States v. 
Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009) (procedurally reasonable sentence “„must 
reflect a district court‟s meaningful consideration of the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)‟”) (quoting United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007)).  With 
respect to the contention that Dixon was providing support for his children, the District 
Court noted that there was no verification of Dixon‟s job history.  It stated, “[t]here are 
lots of things that Mr. Dixon has said he has done that indicated he was productive.  None 
of those records have been produced.  There has not been verification of any of those 
things.”  (A. 103.)  The court considered his youthfulness at the time of some of the 
crimes, but found that his criminal history went well past his youth.  The court, moreover, 
considered Dixon‟s offered reason for illegally re-entering the country, dismissing it in 
part because “in the Presentence report you said you didn‟t exactly know where [your 
children] are.”  (A. 98.)   The court also considered similar arguments Dixon made 
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concerning the disparity of his sentence, finding that his “substantial criminal history . . . 
is of grave concern to the Court. . . . [In another case] the criminal history was overstated 
because they involved all misdemeanors.  That‟s certainly not the case with Mr. Dixon.”  
(A. 94.)  The court, moreover, was statutorily empowered to consider Dixon‟s criminal 
history in the context of the § 3553(a) factors, as well as in the sentencing guidelines 
calculation.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the court to consider “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”).  That 
the District Court may have given particular weight to the need to deter criminals does 
not mean that it failed to give meaningful consideration to all § 3553(a) factors.  Thus, 
Dixon has failed to show procedural error on the part of the District Court. 
Because we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on [Dixon] for the reasons the district court provided[,]”  Tomko, 562 
F.3d at 568, Dixon also has failed to show that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.  
The District Court did not solely consider one or two factors, but rather contemplated the 
totality of section 3553(a). 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.      
